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Abstract
I develop a neoclassical growth model in which the government accumulates con-
testable social infrastructure. In this framework, both a more accountable and more
fairness governance encourages governmental accumulation of social infrastructure
which fosters productivity. According to the calibrated model, for a country in the
lower decile of the distribution of the index of social infrastructure, improving gover-
nance fairness by one standard deviation increases, on average, social infrastructure
by 84% and GDP per worker by around 38%. However, the quantitative impact
of improving governance accountability on social infrastructure and productivity is
negligible.
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1 Introduction
Good public governance is crucial for the prosperity of nations (Olson (1993)) because
governments are in charge of setting and maintaining the formal economic institutional
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structure of society, which shapes human behavior (North (1990)) and, consequently,
determines resource allocation. Using the terminology of Hall and Jones (1999), the
governments are in charge of social infrastructure. Social infrastructure refers to the
institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within
which individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output
(Hall and Jones, 1999).1 While, governments set and maintain social infrastructure, it
must also be recognized that, quite often, individuals or groups with competing interests
engage in a contest to influence political or bureaucratic decisions in their favor (Olson
(2000)). The theory of rent-seeking (Tullock, 1967) views contests as an inevitable feature
of political discretion. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that weaker states also
display higher levels of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny (1993)).
Empirical evidence suggests that good governance is positively related to economic
development. Table 1 displays the coeﬃcients of correlation between six governance indi-
cators, Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per worker and
an index of social infrastructure for a sample of 157 countries (Panel (a)) as well as the
average values of these variables for the deciles of the distribution of the index of social
infrastructure (Panel (b)).2 The coeﬃcients of correlation between the governance indi-
cators and both TFP and GDP per worker are positive and high. Keefer (2004) reviews
the economic literature on governance and argues that a growing body of evidence points
to governance failures as a root cause of slow and inequitable economic growth as well
as a defining characteristic of most poor countries. Gradstein (2004) also surveys some
works presenting empirical evidence that the quality of governance has a robust eﬀect on
growth.
The objective of this work is to analyze the relationship between governance, social
infrastructure and productivity and to evaluate the extent to which diﬀerences in gover-
nance can account for cross-country diﬀerences in social infrastructure and productivity.
1Hall and Jones (1999) include not only institutions but also policies in their concept of social in-
frastructure. The inclusion of policies is controversial. However, Baland et al. (2010) justify this by
arguing that policies, like institutions, are chosen by those with political power and they have a large
impact on the incentive structure of society
2The governance indicators are provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project of
the World Bank (see Kaufman et al., 2010). I describe the way how the index of social infrastructure is
elaborated in Section 5. Furthermore, I provide the definitions of the governance indicators.
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To this end, I develop a neoclassical growth model in which the government accumulates
non-rival social infrastructure, while individuals contest the productive services of social
infrastructure with lower or higher success depending on governance fairness. Contest for
social infrastructure is a rent-seeking activity because it implies the unproductive use of
resources.3 In the model, the government seeks to maximize its political support which is
a function of both the utility enjoyed by households and the free provision of services by
the government to households. This function of political support intends reflect the idea
that the political support to the government might depend on clientelistic relationships
between government and the citizens as well as the idea that citizens observing poorly
the influence of governmental policies on their utility and with weak capacity to monitor
governmental performance might base their political support on some variable that they
observe more accurately, in particular on the direct provision of government services.
Patrimonialism or clientelism is a style of governance where policies/favors are distrib-
uted in exchange of political support and that prevails in developing countries (Baland et
al. (2010)).4 Some empirical works find an eﬀect of targeted transfers on individual vot-
ing intentions and behavior (see, for example, Markus (1988), Levitt and Snyder (1997),
Elinder et al. (2008), and Manacorda et al. (2011). Moreover, there also is some empirical
evidence that political institutions can aﬀect the clientelistic behavior of the government.5
Manzetti and Wilson (2007) cite a lot of works arguing both empirical and theoretically
that clientelism is most entrenched in polities where resources are scarce and controlled by
political cliques. Some authors show that the electoral system influences the clientelistic
behavior of the government (see, for example, Ames (1995), Cain et al. (1987), Carey
and Shugart (1995), Mitchell (2000), Persson et al. (2003) and Samuels (1999)). Keefer
(2005) finds empirical evidence suggesting a strong association between weak institutions
and clientelism in young democracies. Geddes (1991) argues that robust, balanced party
3As Tullock (1980) asserts: "the term rent-seeking is designed to describe behavior in institutional
settings where individual eﬀorts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus."
4The provision of goods and services by the government with clientelistic purposes is very usual in
development countries. Argentinian newspaper La Razón entitled in June, 20th 1997 “They denounce that
Maduro gives away “ scholarships, tablets, washing machines and refrigerators” to win the elections”. In
Galicia, a region in the northwestern of Spain, the prototype of the clientelistic gifts is that the government
places a lamppost in front of the door of your house.
5Hicken (2011) argues that clientelism can adapt to a variety of political settings and, in democracies,
it is a tool for building a loyal network of political supporters.
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competition induces politicians to abandon clientelism.
Some empirical evidence shows that the institutional settings fostering voice and ac-
countability lead that political support provided by the citizens to the government depends
to a larger extent on their welfare and less on clientelistic policies.6 Criado and Herreros
(2007) discuss how the institutional context can aﬀect the attribution of responsibilities
for policy outcomes (see Powell (2000)). In particular, Powell and Whiten (1993), us-
ing data of 102 elections in 19 developed democracies, show that if political institutions
foster the clarity of political responsibility of government, then citizen’s political support
depends on economic performance to a larger extent and Criado and Herreros (2007),
using evidence from 17 European countries, show that the eﬀect of the government per-
formance on political support is higher in majoritarian democracies, where the attribution
of responsibility for policy outcomes is clear, than in proportional democracies. The find-
ings by Aaskoven (2016) suggest that lacking government transparency might encourage
creation of public employment for clientelistic purposes. In particular, using panel data
for 20 OECD countries, Aaskoven (2016) finds that economic growth increases public
employment under low fiscal transparency and that this eﬀect is strongest in years of
election; however, higher fiscal transparency lowers the positive eﬀect of growth on public
employment, primarily in election years.7
The model is intended to capture the idea that governments design the institutional
framework and implements the policies under which the economic activities are developed,
while individuals devote resources to manipulate existing institutions and policies as well
as to achieve that the government sets new institutions and implements new policies in
their benefit. An example may be useful to better understand the model. Suppose that
a government issues transport licenses which increase the utility of services provided by
carriers who are licensed because possession of the license guarantees better services to
their customers. The government should invest resources in drafting a law regulating
licenses, in issuing licenses and their oversight. A law regulating licenses is a non-rival
6Some authors have argued that political support depends on the government policies aﬀecting welfare
of households (see, for example, Kramer (1971), Nordhaus (1975); Fair (1978), Fiorina (1981), Weather-
ford (1984, 1987), Levi and Stoker (2000), and Hetherington (2005)).
7Kitschelt (2000) noted how poorer and less educated people are less interested in politicians who
promise public goods (as opposed to individualized ones).
4
good. Carriers compete for getting these licenses: the higher resources a carrier invests to
get a license, the higher his probability to get it, while the higher resources other carriers
invest to get a license, the lower his probability to get it. Many others examples in
addition to licensing of transport services can be found. Lobbyism is other good example:
the lobbyists try that the government implements the rules more suitable for their interests
or applies the existing rules in line with them.8 According to a widely accepted definition,
institutions are the rules of game and their enforcement. Therefore, to some extent, when
local or regional governments contest public revenues or local public goods, implicitly they
are contesting the social infrastructure. For example, if two governments are competing
for setting a police station in their jurisdiction, then, to some extent, they are contesting
the rule of law. The contestation of social infrastructure is everywhere. To some extent,
household spending in protecting its property implies to contest the social infrastructure
because the higher the spending of a household regarding its neighbor, the lower the
probability that its property is violated and the higher the confronted probability by its
neighbors.
Therefore, in the model, governance is characterized by two attributes: accountabil-
ity and fairness. Accountability refers to the weight that the individuals gives to their
utility relatively to the free and direct provision of services by the government in deter-
mining their political support. Fairness refers to the ability of the government to resist
the pressures of the individuals to manipulate the social infrastructure in their favor or,
the flip side, the ability of individuals to influence the government and to manipulate the
social infrastructure for their own benefit. These attributes are related to some concepts
concerning government developed by the political science, although the correspondence is
far from perfect. In particular, Dahl (1971) argues that democracy -or polyarchy, accord-
ing to his terminology- is characterized by two features: contestation and inclusiveness.
Contestation means that citizens have unimpaired opportunities to formulate their pref-
erences, to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government, and to
have their preferences weighted equally in the conduct of the government. Inclusiveness is
8Campos and Giovannoni (2017) find that lobbysm is an eﬀective way to influence political decissions
and that the ability of lobbysts to influence policies depends on institutions, in particular on electoral
rules.
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referred to the proportion of population entitled to participate in contesting the conduct
of the government.
According to the model, diﬀerences in governance do not influence accumulation of
physical capital –which is consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Inklaar
and Timmer (2013) according to which the ratio of capital to GDP is not markedly
correlated with GDP per worker across countries–, but they aﬀect productivity through
TFP. In particular, higher governance fairness discourages rent-seeking and fosters invest-
ment in social infrastructure, while a more accountable government invests more in social
infrastructure and is less clientelistic because reduces its free provision of services. There-
fore, improving governance increases TFP and productivity because countries with better
governance have more social infrastructure. The results are consistent with the empiri-
cal evidence that connects higher corruption –an indicator of government unfairness–
and worse economic performance (see, for example, Mauro (1995), Lambsdorﬀ (2003) and
Johnson et al. (2011)).9
The model is calibrated and simulated to assess the quantitative impact of improving
governance of social infrastructure and productivity. To this end, an index of social
infrastructure as well as proxies for governance fairness and governance accountability are
built. In particular, the proxy used for governance fairness is built using the indicator
Control of Corruption, while the proxy used for governance accountability is built using
the indicator Voice and Accountability. An index of social infrastructure is built using
other four governance indicators: Government Eﬀectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of
Law and Political Stability. In the data, countries in the ten decile of social infrastructure
distribution have, on average, 3924 times higher social infrastructure, 316 times higher
TFP and 683 times higher GDP per worker than countries in the first decile. In the
model, these figures are 251, 139 and 164.
According to the calibrated model, improving governance fairness has a significant
impact on social infrastructure and productivity of countries with low levels of social
infrastructure, but improving governance accountability has a negligible impact. In par-
9Recently, Campos et al. (2016) survey the econometric evidence on the relationship between corrup-
tion and growth.
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ticular, for countries in the average of the first decile of the distribution of the index of
social infrastructure, an increase by one standard deviation in the indicator Control of
Corruption increases, on average, social infrastructure by 841% and GDP per worker by
around 38%. However, social infrastructure and GDP per worker only increase by around
04% and 020%, respectively, if the indicator Voice and Accountability increases by one
standard deviation. I report the impact of a one standard deviation increase because, ac-
cording to the distribution of the index, it can be considered a normal (or likely) increase
that might be achieved by means of reasonable institutional reforms.10
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe previous works in related
areas. The model is described in Section 3. The long-run impact of governance on social
infrastructure and productivity is analyzed in Section 4. The model is calibrated and
simulated in Section 5 in order to assess the quantitative impact of improving governance
on social infrastructure and productivity. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The model extends the standard neoclassical growth model to include a government that
accumulates social infrastructure contested by households. In this framework, rent-seeking
activities are devoted to manipulate institutions and government policies. In this sense,
this paper is related to the literature introducing rent-seeking in growth models. Some
works consider that rent-seeking entails predatory activities devoted to appropriate the
property of others in a context of imperfect security of property rights (see, for example,
Tornell and Velasco (1992), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Grossman and Kim (1996),
Barelli and De Abreu Pessôa (2012), Bethencourt and Perera-Tallo (2014) and del Rio
(2018)). Park et al. (2005) consider that rent-seeking activities are devoted to appropriate
the government tax revenues, Torvik (2002) considers that rent-seeking activities are
devoted to appropriate the rents of a natural resource, and Gonzalez (2005) argues that
10Pande and Udry (2006) provide an excellent and comprehensive review of the macroeconomic liter-
ature on institutions and growth that has largely relied on cross-country regression evidence. In order
to summarize the findings of the literature, they also reported on the impact of one standard deviation
increase in the indexes of institutional quality on productivity and growth.
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anticipation of conflict caused by rent-seeking gives rise to technological backwardness. In
these works, security of property rights is exogenous and government does not play any
role. However, Gradstein (2004) endogenizes the emergence of property rights within a
simple growth framework and Chin and Chou (2004) develop a growth model with rent-
seeking in which government creates new social infrastructure. In the Gradstein’s (2004)
model, the individuals are in charge of protecting their properties, it is not the tasks of a
government, and in the Chin and Chou’s (2004) model, government is benevolent planner
and the rent-seeking activities are predatory.11
Very often it has been emphasized that defective institutions encourage rent-seeking,
but, as the model developed here shows, rent-seeking might also hamper the development
of virtuous institutions by discouraging government investment in social infrastructure.
The works cited in the previous paragraph highlight that rent-seeking leads to the waste
and misallocation of resources as well as discourages capital accumulation, innovation,
technological adoption or eﬀort. However, in my model, rent-seeking aﬀects negatively
productivity because it disincentives government investment in social infrastructure (i.e.,
rent-seeking worsen the institutional context). In this sense, my work is related to Grad-
stein’s (2008) model in which individuals contest a public good whose provision is deter-
mined by a weighted majority rule (the rich are more weighted than the poor) as well as to
De Vaal and Ebben’s (2011) growth model in which the eﬀect of bureaucratic corruption
on economic growth is highly dependent on the institutional setting of a country because
corruption entails wasting of resources in rent-seeking activities and stealing public goods,
but it also may fulfill positive role by taking over the role of institutions.12
The model is empirically implemented in order to quantitatively evaluate the impact
of improving governance on social infrastructure and productivity. In this sense, my paper
is related to the literature evaluating the relationship between institutions and economic
development. Some authors, in the tradition of North and Thomas (1973) (see, for exam-
ple, Knack and Keefer,1997, Hall and Jones,1999, Acemoglu et al., 2001, and Rodrik et
al., 2004) find that cross-country income diﬀerences are largely explained by institutional
11Gradstein (2007) considers the emergence of property rights protection as a political outcome.
12Aidt (2003) surveys the economic literature on corruption and finds that, sometimes, corruption can
improve the economic performance.
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diﬀerences.13 Other authors have focused their attention on the eﬀects of governance
on economic performance. In particular, using cross-country data, Campos and Nugent
(1999) find that good governance is positively related to GDP per capita and negatively
related to child mortality and adult illiteracy, while Globerman and Shapiro (2002) focus
on governance and find that good governance has a positive impact on foreign direct in-
vestment. Jonasson (2011), using data from 5 500 Brazilian municipalities, shows that
informal employment is lower in regions with better governance. Using panel data over
1990 − 2010, Cingolani et al. (2015) find that bureaucratic autonomy has an impor-
tant impact on two indicators of economic development: child mortality and tuberculosis
prevalence. Fatas and Mihov (2013) find that governments that implement frequent and
large changes in government spending unrelated to the state of the business cycle generate
lower economic growth.14 The authors mentioned above follow an econometric approach
to evaluate the impact of institutions on cross-country income diﬀerences as well as other
economic variables. However, I develop a general equilibrium growth model to evaluate
the impact of governance on social infrastructure and productivity.
Therefore, this paper also relates to a strand of macroeconomic literature that develop
general equilibrium macroeconomic models that analyze how and to what extent institu-
tions and economic policies that are responsible for resource misallocation (see, for exam-
ple, Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009, Poschke 2010, Barseghyan
and DiCecio, 2011, Moscoso-Boedo and Mukoyama, 2012, del Río and Sampayo, 2017
and del Río, 2018) or technological backwardness (see Parente and Prescott, 2000) can
account for the observed diﬀerences in productivity across countries.
Finally, my model analyzes how some government features aﬀect its performance.
In particular, my model shows that governance accountability reduces free provision of
government services and encourages governmental investment in social infrastructure as
well as that political institutions that promote governance fairness discourage rent-seeking
and foster the accumulation of social infrastructure. In this sense, my work is related
13Holcombe and Boudreaux (2016) analyze whether market institutions generate income inequality,
but they find that the results depend on the used dataset.
14However, Kwon and Kim (2014) only find a significant impact of good governance on reducing poverty
in middle-income countries, but not in low-income countries, and Wilson (2016), using data for China
provinces, finds that causality runs from growth to governance.
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to the literature on the political economy of state capacity. For example, Besley and
Persson (2009) argue that political stability and inclusive political institutions enhance
state capacity to tax and to provide productivity-enhancing public goods and Acemoglu
(2005) argues that weak states where rulers have short time horizons spend too little on
productive public goods, while strong states where rulers have too much security of tenure
have blunt accumulation incentives.15 However, unlike these authors, I incorporate the
analysis of governance into a standard neoclassical growth model.
3 The model
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical households with measure 1. House-
holds produce output that they devote to consumption, investment in physical capital,
to pay taxes to the government, and rent-seeking activities contesting the productive ser-
vices of non-rival social infrastructure. The government finances its investment in social
infrastructure and its provision of government services to households by collecting taxes,
user fees and bribes.
Social infrastructure
The aggregate stock of non-rival social infrastructure at time + 1, +1, is the result
of accumulative decisions by the government,
+1 =  +  (1)
where 0  1 −   1 is the economic depreciation rate of social infrastructure,  is
government investment per capita in social infrastructure at time , and 1 is government
eﬀectiveness in accumulating social infrastructure at time  which  depends inversely on
aggregate output per capita at time , . It expresses the idea that a larger economy is
also more complex and needs more and more complex institutions to work. Therefore,
the higher the output, the greater the required government eﬀort to maintain the level of
social infrastructure.16
15Acemoglu et al. (2011) analyze the role of bureaucracies in creating eﬀective states.
16Barro (1990) considers in Section IV of his now-classic paper the case in which the amount of public
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Households
Each household has  individuals at time , where   0 is the population gross
growth rate. Each individual is endowed with a unit of labor. Household output per
capita at time , , is given by
 = (1−)   (2)
where  ≥ 1 is the gross rate of labor-augmenting technological progress, 0    1, 0 
  1,  are the productive services per capita for a household of the social infrastructure
at time , and  is household physical capital per capita at time , which evolves according
to,
+1 =  +  (3)
where  is household investment per capita in physical capital and 0  1−   1 is the
depreciation rate of physical capital.
Households contest social infrastructure. In particular, the productive services per
capita that a household obtains from the existing social infrastructure at time  are
 = 
µ

¶
 (4)
where  are the resources per capita devoted by a household to contesting social in-
frastructure at time  and  are the aggregate (by all households) resources per capita
devoted to contesting social infrastructure at time . Function  is the contest success
function: 0  0 00  0,  (1) = 1, and 0 (1) ≡   0.17 The activities aimed to
contesting the social infrastructure are purely rent-seeking activities because they do not
increase productivity or output.
The instantaneous utility function of a member of a household is  ( ) = ln  +
services that an individual receives is roughly proportional to the amount of property that the person has
to protect. Barro (1990) points out that this hypothesis is reasonable for some public services such as
police, fire protection and national defense. The assumption also seems reasonable for most of economic
institutions securing property, enforcing contracts and regulating economic activity. As Barro (1990)
writes: "These cases can be approximated by assuming that each individual holds constant his ratio of
public services to output , , rather than his level of public services".
17Mills (1961) proposed a contest success function to model promotional competition and Tullock (1975,
1980) introduced it in the theory of rent-seeking. Van Long (2013) reviews the theory of contests.
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 ln , where   0,  is household private consumption per capita at time  and  is
the provision of government services per capita at time . The government services are
freely provided by the government, but they are not public goods (i.e., non-excludible and
non-rival goods).18 A household maximizes its intertemporal utility,
 =
∞X
=0
() (ln  +  ln ) (5)
subject to its production function (2), the evolution law of capital per capita (3), the
contest constraint (4), and its budget constraint per capita  +  +  = − , where 
are net lump-sum taxes per capita paid by a household to the government at time  and
 is the time discount rate. It is assumed that 0    1 which guarantees that the
transversality condition is satisfied. Every household is atomistically small; therefore, it
assumes that its rent-seeking eﬀorts do not have aggregate consequences.
The optimal choice of a household is characterized by the Euler condition,
+1+1 +  =
1

+1
  (6)
which states that the marginal return to investment in physical capital for a household
equals the marginal rate of substitution of current for future consumption, and

0
µ

¶ 
 = 1 (7)
which states that the marginal revenue of contesting social infrastructure equals its mar-
ginal cost, which is equal to 1.
Symmetric equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, the aggregate variables per capita and the household
variables per capita are equal,  =  and  = . From equation (4) and the first
order condition (7), it follows that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the productive services
18The education and healthcare services could be good examples of government services which are
not public goods. Moreover, other services provided directly by government to households reflecting
clientelistic relationships could also be included in .
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per capita for a household of social infrastructure equal the aggregate stock of social
infrastructure,  = , and that the fraction of output devoted to rent-seeking is constant,
 = . It is assumed that 0    1 in order to guarantee that the resources devoted
to rent-seeking are not higher than output.
A fraction 0    1 of the resources devoted to rent-seeking by households are
transferred to the government through bribes or user fees that, together the lump-sum
transfers from households, , are the government revenues, while the fraction 1 −  is
wasted in the rent-seeking process. In a symmetric equilibrium, the amount per capita of
bribes and user fees is  =  and aggregate output per capita after rent-seeking isb where b ≡ 1− (1− ). Therefore, the aggregate resource constraint per capita is
 +  +  +  = b (8)
which states that he sum of resources devoted by households to consumption and invest-
ment in physical capital and by the government to investment in social infrastructure and
provision of government services equals the available resources after rent-seeking.
Government
Political support given by households to the government is  =  +  where
  0,  is household intertemporal utility given by (5) and  = P∞=0 ()  ln 
is the weighted discounted sum of the provision of government services per capita (in
logs). The government chooses investment in social infrastructure, , and the provision of
government services, , to maximize its political support subject to the resource constraint
(8) considering (3), the household Euler condition (6) and the evolution law of social
infrastructure (1). Therefore, the maximization problem of the government is
max
{}∞=0
∞X
=0
() (ln  + b ln )
subject to
 = b −  −  − +1 +  (9)
+1 = 
µ
 +1+1 + 
¶
 (10)
13
and
+1 =  +  (11)
where  is given by (2) and b ≡  (1 + ).19
The first order conditions of the maximization problem of the government are
() b 1 = 1 (12)
() 1 = 1 − 
µ
 +1+1 + 
¶
2 (13)
()+1 1+1 = 2 (14)
3 1 = 1 (15)
and
1+1b+1+1 + 2 +1+1+1 + 3+1
Ã
 − +1
¡−+1¢−
+1+1
!
= 3 (16)
where 1, 2 and 3 are the Lagrange multipliers. From (12)-(14) it follows that
(1 + )  = b (17)
which states that the government equates its marginal rate of substitution of government
services to private consumption to 1+. From (16), using (12)-(15), it follows the Euler
equation of the government,
∙
+1+1
1

µb− +1+1 + 1 +  +1
¶
+  +1
¸
 = 1
+1
  (18)
which states that the marginal return to investment in social infrastructure equals the
marginal rate of substitution of current for future consumption. The return to investment
in social infrastructure depends on (i) the marginal productivity of social infrastructure,
19The government solves a Ramsey-type problem.
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+1+1 , adjusted by (i.a) the eﬃciency in accumulating social infrastructure, 1 , (i.b) the
resource wastage in rent-seeking activities, b, (i.c) the loss of eﬃciency in accumulating
social infrastructure due to the increase in output caused by a higher rate of investment
in social infrastructure, +1+1 , (i.d) the increase in marginal productivity of capital and,
consequently, in the return of saving, 
1+
+1 , (ii) the economic depreciation rate of social
infrastructure,  +1 , which depends on the growth rate of output per capita because the
eﬃciency in accumulating social infrastructure decreases when output per capita grows,
and (iii) the population gross growth rate, , because social infrastructure is non-rival.
The features of governance
Parameter  is elasticity of the productive services per capita with respect to the eﬀort
per capita when  = .20 It indicates the increase in the productive services of the social
infrastructure that a household obtains when it increases a little, with regard to the other
households, its rent-seeking activities. Therefore, it reflects the ability of households to
influence the government and to manipulate the social infrastructure for their own benefit
as well as the ability of the government to maintain its neutrality or impartiality when it is
pressured by households. It is called the degree of governance unfairness or, alternatively,
its inverse, 1, is called the degree of governance fairness.
Parameter  weights the importance that an individual gives to the provision of govern-
ment services relatively to its utility in determining its political support. The importance
that an individual gives to its utility can depend on several and diﬀerent circumstances,
but, in particular, such as suggested by some empirical evidence discussed in the intro-
ductory section, an individual might give more importance to its utility in determining its
political support if it trusts that government policies aim improving its welfare. Trust will
be foster by institutional settings in which citizens are well informed and exert a severe
control over government. For this reason,  is called the degree of governance unaccount-
ability or, alternatively, its inverse, 1, is called the degree of governance accountability.
In the next section, the long-run eﬀects of governance on social infrastructure and
productivity are analyzed.
20 ≡ d d   = 0
³


´



 , which, if  = , then it is equal to .
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4 The long-run influence of governance on social in-
frastructure and productivity
Along a BGP, variables per capita        and  grow at the same constant
rate,  − 1, while social infrastructure, , remains constant.
It follows from the production function (2) that output per capita is a function of the
ratio of physical capital to output,  , and TFP, ,
 = 
1
1−
µ

¶ 
1−  (19)
On one hand, along a BGP, the ratio of physical capital to output is

 =

1
 − 
 (20)
which follows from the Euler condition (6) taking into account that, along a BGP, house-
hold private consumption per capita grows at the rate  − 1. On the other hand, TFP
depends on the productive services of social infrastructure and the state of technical
progress,
 = (1−) (21)
which follows from (2) and (19).Taking into account that, along a BGP, the stock of
social infrastructure remains constant, it follows from (11) that, along a BGP, social
infrastructure is given by
 = 1
1− 

  (22)
where  is the investment rate in social infrastructure. Under the BGP conditions, it
follows from the Euler equation for the government (18) and equation (22) that, along a
BGP, the investment rate in social infrastructure is
0 = b+ 1   (23)
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where 0 ≡
1
−
(1−) + 1  1 and 1 ≡ 1+
³
1
 −

´
 0. From the aggregate resource
constraint per capita (8), using (17), it follows that
2  = b− 3 −   (24)
where 2 ≡ 1 + 1+  1 and
0   = 
− 

 − 
≡ 3  1 (25)
is the investment rate. Equation (25) follows from the evolution law of physical capital
(3) taking into account (20) and that, along a BGP, physical capital per capita grows at
the rate  − 1.
The following parameter condition is necessary to guarantee the existence of an interior
BGP. I call interior BGP to a BGP in which the ratios  ,
 ,

 , and
 are constant and
between 0 and b. In particular, Assumption 1 imposes that along a BGP the investment
rate  = 3 is suﬃciently lower than the fraction of resources remaining after rent-seeking
to guarantee that   0.
Assumption 1 b  3 ³1− 10´−1.
The following proposition states that under Assumption 1 there exists a unique interior
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique interior BGP.
Proof: From (23)-(24) it follows that

 =
b (2 + 1)− 13
02 + 1 (26)
and

 =
b (0 − 1)− 03
02 + 1  (27)
Under assumption 1, it follows from (26) and (27) that 0    b and 0    b. From
Assumption 1, it follows that 0   = 3  b. If 0    b, 0    b and 0   =
3  b, then from the aggregate resource constraint per capita (9) and equation (17), it follows
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that 0    b.¤
The following proposition states that improving any of the two considered features
of governance –fairness and accountability– entails an increases of the government in-
vestment rate in social infrastructure. Moreover, the investment rate in physical capital
does not depend on any governmental attribute, thus, the ratio of physical capital does
not depend on quality of governance. Therefore, governance influences output per worker
through TFP because the latter depends on social infrastructure.
Proposition 2Along an interior BGP, under Assumption 1, (i) the investment rate in
social infrastructure,  , and the stock of social infrastructure, , are increasing functions
of governance fairness, 1 , and governance accountability,
1
 (ii) the investment rate in
physical capital,  , and the ratio of physical capital to output,
 , do not depend on either
1
 or
1
 . (iii) TFP, , and output per capita, , are increasing functions 1 , and 1 .
Proof: Diﬀerentiation of the Napierian logarithm of (26) with respect to the Napierian
logarithm of , and b yields
d ln 
d ln = −
(1− )b02 + 13  0 (28)
and
d ln 
d ln b = − bb
³
0 − 
´
(1 + ) (02 + 1)  0 (29)
From (22) it follows that  is an increasing function of  . Therefore, (i) follows from (28), (29)
and (22).(ii) follows from (20) and (25).(iii) follows from (i), (ii), (19), (21) and (22).¤
On one hand, a higher degree of governance fairness (i.e., a lower ) leads households
to decrease their rent-seeking intensity, which encourages government investment in social
infrastructure because lower resource wastage increases the return to investment in social
infrastructure. On the other hand, higher governance accountability (i.e., a lower ) leads
the government to reduce its free provision of services and its tax burden on households
that increase their private consumption, which leads the government to increase its invest-
ment in social infrasctructure because the return to investment in social infrastructure
increases. Therefore, social infrastructure, TFP and output per capita increase when both
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fairness and accountability of governance improve.21
5 Cross-country diﬀerences in governance, social in-
frastructure and productivity
In this section, I analyze the quantitative impact of improving governance on social in-
frastructure and both TFP and GDP per worker. To this end, the model is calibrated
and simulated.
The index of social infrastructure
The WGI project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215
economies over the period 1996—2014, for the following six dimensions of governance: (1)
Rule of Law (), which reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
(2) Regulatory Quality (), which reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development. (3) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (), which
measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated
violence, including terrorism. (4) Government Eﬀectiveness (), which reflects percep-
tions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementa-
tion, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. (5) Voice and
Accountability ( ), which reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and a free media. (6) Control of Corruption (), which reflects
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
21If the government gets a higher fraction of the resources devoted to rent-seeking (that is,  is higher),
then it increases its investment rate in social infrastructure. This is because fewer resources are wasted
in rent-seeking activities and, consequently, the return to investment in social infrastructure for the
government is higher. Cowen et al. (1994) argue that, when some public policies generate rents for
public oﬃcials, rent-seeking in politics can motivate them to provide public goods.
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both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and
private interests.
Governance is among the more elastic concepts in the social science and development
lexicons (Keefer (2004)). However, according to Keefer (2004), it can be defined as (i)
the extent to which government are responsive to citizens and provide them with certain
core services and (ii) the extent to which institutions and processes of government give to
decision makers an incentive to be responsive to citizens. Therefore, governance has two
dimensions: on one hand, the results of government and, on the other hand, the incentives
faced by the government. According to these two dimensions, the economic literature on
governance has focused its interest in analyzing the relationship between the results of
governance and economic development as well as in analyzing the relationship between
the features of governance and the performance of governments.
The governance indicators provided by the World Bank are proxies of both the results
of government (Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, Government Eﬀectiveness and Political
Stability) and the attributes of government (Voice and Accountability and Control of
Corruption).22 In the empirical analysis below, it is assumed that the indicator Control
of Corruption reflects the concept of governance fairness (the inverse of  in the model),
while the indicator Voice and Accountability reflects the concept of accountability ( the
inverse of  in the model).
An index of social infrastructure relative to the United States is calculated for each
country in the sample as the geometric average of three indicators of governance (Rule of
Law, Regulatory Quality and Political Stability) relative to those indicators for the United
States. The two first indicators (Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality) are multiplied by
the indicator Government Eﬀectiveness in order to adjust for quality. In particular, the
elaborated index of social infrastructure, b, is
b = ³bb´ 13 ³bb´ 13 ³b´ 13 
22Really, sometimes the diﬀerence between the results of governance and the features of governance is
a little contrived, and a same indicator can be reflecting both the results of governance and the features
of governance.
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where b denotes the value for country  of indicator ,  =  , relative to the
United States.23 The indicator Rule of Law measures the security of property rights and
contract enforcement. The indicator Regulatory Quality measures quality of business
regulations. Therefore, the indicators Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality provide im-
portant information about the rules that determine the allocation of resources. However,
both indicators are adjusted by the indicator Government Eﬀectiveness because the ex-
tent to which this set of institutions are eﬀective depends on government eﬀectiveness in
their implementation and enforcement. Moreover, the eﬃcacy of many institutions and
policies depends on their stability. Political instability can motivate frequent changes in
institutions and policies, which might imply a loss of their eﬃcacy. For this reason, the
indicator Political Stability is included in the index.
Proxies for the features of governance
Using the indicator Control of Corruption, I build a proxy for the degree of governance
unfairness in each country,  = ()1− (), where b is the value for country  of
the indicator Control of Corruption relative to the United States,  is the degree of gov-
ernance unfairness in country ,  is its calibrated value below and  is an upper bound
such that the highest fraction of output devoted to carrying out rent-seeking activities
is 1,  = 1, and it is also calibrated below. I use the indicator Voice and Account-
ability to build a proxy for the degree of governance unaccountability in each country,
1 +  = (1 + ) b−1 , where b is the value for country  of the indicator Voice and Ac-
countability relative to the United States,  is the degree of governance unaccountability
in country  and  is its calibrated value below. Building the degree of governance un-
accountability in this way allows to define b = bb−1 which is suited for the quantitative
exercises because equilibrium depends on b, not on the particular combination of  and
 giving rise to b.
Calibration
I assign the following values to the parameters of the model. (i)  = 1
3
, which is the
norm in the literature and is close to the output elasticity for capital estimated by Kydland
23Easterly and Levine (2003) build an Institutions Index equal to the arithmetic average of the six
governance indicators elaborated by Kaufman et al. (1999a, b) which are similar to the WGI.
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and Prescott (1982) for the United States, 0365. (ii) The output elasticity for social
infrastructure is estimated using the cross-country regression ln[  = 0 + 1 ln b,
where [  is TFP of country  relative to the United States.24 The estimated value for 1
is 0351, therefore, I set  = 0351. (iii) Upper bound  is such that  = 1. Therefore
 = 285. (iv) According to NIPA, U.S. government consumption expenditures and gross
investment represented 3 157 billions of dollars in 2014 which was around 17% of U.S.
GDP in this year, while U.S. government expenditures in general public services, national
defense and public order and safety represented 1 8567 billions of dollars.25 Therefore
I set  = 010 and  = 007. (v) Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2007) find that
in Ukraine the amount of bribery accounted for 1% − 15% of GDP in 2003.26 Since
government revenues from rent-seeking do not come exclusively from bribes, but also
from user fees,  = 002 is a reasonable figure. (vi) The U.S. annual population growth
rate and the U.S. annual growth rate of GDP per worker were around 1% and 18%,
respectively. Therefore, I set  = 101 and  = 1018. (vii) I set  = 108 which means an
annual interest rate by 8% that, together with  = 1018, implies an annual discount rate
 = 0943. (viii) The annual depreciation rate of NIPA fixed assets is around 5%, therefore
I set  = 095. (ix) Social infrastructure is a kind of intangible capital and Parente and
Prescott (2001) argue that the depreciation rate of intangible capital is around 2%-3%.
Therefore, I set  = 0975. (x) From the resource constraint (Under (i)-(ix), from (17),
(23) and (24), considering that b = 1−  (1− ), it follows that b = 0246,  = 0271,
 = 0555 and  = 0211.27
Results
24Data on GDP, employment, and capital are taken from the Penn World Tables 9.1 (PWT 9.1) for
the year 2014. TFP for each country has been calculated according to
 =
µ

¶1− µ 

¶−

where  is GDP,  is employment,  is capital, and  = 13 .
25General public services include three items: executive and legislative, tax collection and financial
managment and other. Public order and safety include four items: police, fire, law courts and prisons
26Svensson (2003) finds that in Uganda bribes account for roughly 8% of the total costs of the firms
on average.
27The calibrated parameters implies that around 95% of output is devoted to contesting social in-
frastructure. Laband and Sophocleus (1992) estimate that total expenditures in transfer activities to be
around 25% of U.S. GNP.
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The model is simulated for the diﬀerent pairs of ( b) in a sample of 157 countries
for the year 2014. The results of the simulation are displayed in Table 2. The 157
countries sampled are grouped in the ten deciles of the distribution of the index of social
infrastructure. The average values for each decile of the simulated TFP, simulated output
per worker and simulated social infrastructure are displayed in the last three columns,
while in the first two columns are displayed the average values of  and b for each
decile. All variables are relative to the calibrate values (i.e., to the United States). In the
model, countries in the ten decile of social infrastructure distribution have, on average,
251 times higher social infrastructure, 139 times higher TFP and 167 times higher GDP
per worker than countries in the first decile (see the last row of Table 2), while in the data
these figures are 3924, 316 and 683 (see the last row of Panel (b) in Table 1).
In order to calculate the impact of improving governance on social infrastructure and
productivity, I perform three quantitative exercises in which I calculate the response of
social infrastructure and productivity to increases by one standard deviation of the indi-
cators Voice and Accountability and Control of Corruption. First, I calculate the relative
values of social infrastructure, GDP per worker and TFP corresponding to the average
values of the indicator Voice and Accountability for each decile of the social infrastruc-
ture distribution (see column 4 in Panel (b) of Table 1) and the average values plus one
standard deviation (03191) of the indicator Control of Corruption. Second, I calculate
the relative values of social infrastructure, GDP per worker and TFP corresponding to
the average values of the indicator Control of Corruption for each decile of the social
infrastructure distribution (see column 10 in Panel (b) of Table 1) and the average values
plus one standard deviation (03495) of the indicator Voice and Accountability. Third,
I calculate the relative values of social infrastructure, GDP per worker and TFP corre-
sponding to the average values for each decile plus one standard deviation of both the
indicator Control of Corruption and the indicator Voice and Accountability. In the three
cases, I calculate the percentage diﬀerences regarding to the relative values of social in-
frastructure, GDP per worker and TFP corresponding to the average values for each decile
of both the indicator Control of Corruption and the indicator Voice and Accountability.
The resulting percentage diﬀerences are displayed in the three panels of Table 3.
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In the model, improving governance fairness has a significant impact on social in-
frastructure and productivity of countries with low levels of social infrastructure, but, for
countries with high levels, the impact is much more reduced. In particular, if the indica-
tor Control of Corruption increases by one standard deviation, then, for a country with
values of this indicator and the indicator Voice and Accountability equal to the average
values of the first decile of the social infrastructure distribution, social infrastructure in-
creases by 831%, which implies an increase of TFP and GDP per worker by 237% and
375%, respectively, while, for a country with the average values of the tenth decile, social
infrastructure increases by 36%, TFP by 125% and GDP per worker by 19% (see Panel
(a) of Table 3).
However, improving governance accountability has a negligible impact on both social
infrastructure and productivity. In particular, if the indicator Voice and Accountability
increases by one standard deviation, then, for a country with values of this indicator and
the indicator Control of Corruption equal to the average values of the first decile of the
social infrastructure distribution, social infrastructure increases by 04%, which implies
an increase in TFP and GDP per worker by 014% and 020%, respectively, while, for
a country with the average values of the tenth decile, social infrastructure increases by
009%, TFP by 003% and GDP per worker by 005% (see Panel (b) of Table 3).
The eﬀect of improving both features of governance at the same time is similar to the
sum of their separate eﬀects. In particular, if both the indicator Voice and Accountability
and the indicator Control of Corruption increase by one standard deviation, then, for a
country with values of these indicators equal to the average values of the first decile of the
social infrastructure distribution, social infrastructure increases by 842%, which implies
an increase in TFP and GDP per worker by 239% and 379%, respectively, while, for
a country with the average values of the tenth decile, social infrastructure increases by
37%, TFP by 128% and GDP per worker by 192% (see Panel (c) of Table 3).
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6 Conclusion
I develop a neoclassical growth model in which the government accumulates non-rival
social infrastructure contested by households. In this framework, improving both gover-
nance fairness and governance accountability increases government investment in social
infrastructure. However, the accumulation of physical capital by households does not de-
pend on any feature of governance. On one hand, a fairer government invest more in social
infrastructure because higher governance fairness discourages households rent-seeking ac-
tivities aimed to contesting social infrastructure. On the other hand, a more accountable
government reduces free provision of government services and increases its investment in
social infrastructure. Therefore, countries with better governance accumulate more social
infrastructure and, consequently, are more productive.
According to the calibrated model, improving governance fairness has an important
impact on social infrastructure and productivity of countries with low levels of social
infrastructure. Therefore, considering that developing countries often have low endow-
ments of social infrastructure, the improvement of governance fairness can be a successful
development policy. In particular, if the indicator Control of Corruption –my proxy of
governance fairness– increases by one standard deviation, then, for a country with values
of this indicator and the indicator Voice and Accountability equal to the average values
of the first decile of the social infrastructure distribution, social infrastructure increases
by 83%, while TFP and GDP per worker increases by around 24% and 38%, respectively.
My quantitative results show that the impact of improving governance accountability
on social infrastructure and productivity is negligible. In particular, if the indicator Voice
and Accountability –my proxy of governance accountability– increases by one standard
deviation, then, for a country with values of this indicator and the indicator Control
of Corruption equal to the average values of the first decile of the social infrastructure
distribution, social infrastructure increases by 04%, while TFP and GDP per worker in-
creases by around 014% and 020%, respectively. However, it must be taken into account
that the model does not consider the interrelation between both features of governance
and, consequently, does not allow to evaluate the potential impact of improving gover-
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nance accountability on rent-seeking and governmental corruption. In future research,
this interaction might be considered.
26
References
Aaskoven, L. (2016), “Fiscal Transparency, Elections and Public Employment: Evidence from
the OECD”, Economics and Politics, 28(3), 317-341.
Acemoglu, D. (2005), “Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 52(7), 1199-1226.
Acemoglu, D., D. Ticchi and A. Vindigni (2011), “Emergence and Persistence of Ineﬀcient
States”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(2), 177-208.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2001), “The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation”, American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369-1401.
Aidt, T. S. (2003), “Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey”, The Economic Journal, 113,
632-652.
Ames, B. (1995), “Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation”, American
Journal of Political Science, 39, 406-433.
Baland, J-M., Moene, K-O., and J.A. Robinson (2010), “Governance and Development”, Hand-
book of Development Economics, 5, 4039-5061.
Barelli, P. and S. De Abreu Pessoa (2012), “Rent-Seeking and Capital Accumulation”, Economic
Inquiry, 50(2), 399-417.
Barro, R. (1990), “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Economic Growth”, Journal of
Political Economy, 98, S103-S125.
Barseghyan, L. and R. DiCecio (2011), “Entry Costs, Industry Structure, and Cross-Country
Income and TFP Diﬀerences", Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 1828-1851
Benhabib, J., and A. Rustichini (1996), “Social Conflict and Growth”, Journal of Economic
Growth, 1(1), 125-142.
Besley, T. and T. Persson (2009), “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation,
and Politics”, American Economic Review, 99:4, 1218-1244.
Bethencourt, C. and F. Perera-Tallo, F. (2015), “Declining Predation during Development: a
Feedback Process”, Economica, 82(326), 253-294.
Cain, B., Ferejohn, J., and Fiorina, M. (1987), The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and
Electoral Independence, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Campos, N. F., and Nugent, J. B. (1999), “Development performance and the institutions of
governance: evidence from East Asia and Latin America”,World Development, 27(3), 439-452.
Campos, N. F., Dimova, R., and A. Saleh (2016), “Corruption and Economic Growth: An
Econometric Survey of the Evidence”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,
172(3), 521-543.
Campos, N. F., and Giovannoni, F. (2017), “Political institutions, lobbying and corruption”,
Journal of Institutional Economics, 13(4), 917-939.
27
Carey, J., and Shugart, M. (1995), “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering
or Electoral Formulas”, Electoral Studies, 14, 417-439.
Chin, M. S. and Y. K. Chou (2004), “Modelling Social Infrastructure and Economic Growth”,
Australian Economic Papers, 43(2), 136-157.
Cingolani, L., Thomsson, K., and de Crombrugghe, D. (2015), “Minding Weber more than
ever? The impacts of state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy on development goals”,
World Development, 72, 191-207.
Cowen, T., A. Glazer and H. McMillan (1994), “Rent Seeking Can Promote the Provision of
Public Goods”, Economics and Politics, 6(2), 131-145.
Criado, H. and Herreros, F. (2007), “Political Support: Taking into Account the Institutional
Context”, Comparative Political Studies, 40(12), 1511-1532.
Dahl, R. A. (1971), Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press.
del Rio, F. (2018), “Property Rights, Predation, and Productivity”, The Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, forthcoming, www.researchgate.net/profile/Fernando Rio.
del Rio, F., and Sampayo, A. (2017), “Complementarity, linkages between firms, and the eﬀect
of entry costs on productivity”, Review of Development Economics, 21(4), 1281-1304.
De Vaal, A., and Ebben, W. (2011), “Institutions and the relation between corruption and
economic growth”, Review of Development Economics, 15(1), 108-123.
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (2003), “Tropics, Germs and Crops: How Endowments Aﬀect Eco-
nomic Development.”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 3-39.
Elinder, M., H. Jordahl, and P. Poutvaara (2008), “Selfish and Prospective: Theory and Evi-
dence of Pocketbook Voting”, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper 3763.
Fair, R. C. (1978), “The Eﬀect of Economic Events on Votes for President”, Review of Economics
and Statistics, 6(2), 159-173.
Fatas, A., and Mihov, I. (2013), “Policy volatility, institutions, and economic growth”, Review
of Economics and Statistics, 95(2), 362-376.
Fiorina, M. P. (1981), Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Geddes B. (1991), “A Game Theoretical Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies”,
American Political Science Review, 85, 371-392.
Globerman, S., and Shapiro, D. (2002), “ Global foreign direct investment flows: The role of
governance infrastructure”, World development, 30(11), 1899-1919.
Gonzalez, F. M. (2005), “Insecure Property and Technological Backwardness”, The Economic
Journal 115, 703-721.
Gorodnichenko, Y. and K. Sabirianova Peter (2007), “Public Sector Pay and Corruption: Mea-
suring Bribery from Micro Data", Journal of Public Economics, 91, 963-991.
28
Gradstein, M. (2004), “Governance and Growth”, Journal of Development Economics, 73, 505-
518.
Gradstein, M. (2007), “Inequality, Democracy and the Protection of Property Rigths”, The
Economic Journal, 117, 252-269.
Gradstein, M. (2008), “Institutional Traps and Economic Growth”, International Economic
Review, 49(3), 1043-1066.
Grossman, H. I. and M. Kim (1996), “Predation and Accumulation”, Journal of Economic
Growth, 1(3), 333-350.
Hall, R. E. and Ch. I. Jones (1999), "‘Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output
Per Worker Than Others?,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1), pp.83-116.
Hetherington, M. J. (2005), Why Trust Matters. Declining Political Trust and the Demise of
American liberalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hicken A. (2011), “Clientelism”, Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 289-310.
Hsieh, C-T. and P.J. Klenow (2009), “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and
India", Quarterly Journal of Economics. 124 (4), 1403-1448.
Holcombe, R. G. and Boudreaux, C. J. (2016), “Market institutions and income inequality”,
Journal of Institutional Economics, 12(2), 263-276.
Inklaar, R. and M. P. Timmer (2013), “Capital, Labor and TFP in PWT8.0”, Groningen Growth
and Development Centre, University of Groningen.
Johnson, N. D., LaFountain, C. L., and S. Yamarik (2011), “Corruption is bad for growth (even
in the United States)”, [Public Choice, 147(3), 377-393.
Jonasson, E. (2011), “Informal employment and the role of regional governance”, Review of
development economics, 15(3), 429-441.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1999a), “Aggregating Governance Indicators”,
World Bank ResearchWorking Paper No. 2195,
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1999b), “Governance Matters”, World Bank
Research Working Paper No. 2196
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2010). "The Worldwide Governance Indicators : A
Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues",World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper No. 5430.
Keefer, P. (2004), “A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: from Property Rights to
Voice”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3315.
Keefer, P. (2005), “Democratization and Credibility: Why are Young Democracies Badly Gov-
erned?”, World Bank Working Paper 3594.
Kitschelt, H. (2000), “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities”, Com-
parative Political Studies, 33, 845-879.
29
Knack, S., and P. Keefer (1997), “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoﬀ? A Cross-
Country Investigation”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251-1288.
Kramer, G. H. (1971), “Short-Term Fluctuations in US Voting Behavior, 1896-1964”, American
Political Science Review, 65(1), 131-43.
Kydland, F.E. and E.C Prescott (1982), “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations", Econo-
metrica, 50, 1345-1370.
Kwon, H. J., and Kim, E. (2014), “Poverty reduction and good governance: Examining the
rationale of the Millennium Development Goals”, Development and Change, 45(2), 353-375.
Laband D. N. and J. P. Sophocleus (1992), “An Estimate of Resource Expenditures on Transfer
Activity in the United States”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 959-983.
Lambsdorﬀ, J.G. (2003), “How Corruption Aﬀects Productivity”, Kyklos, 56(4), 457-474.
Levi, M. and Stoker, L. (2000), “Political Trust and Trustworthiness”, Annual Review of Political
Science, 3, 475-507.
Levitt, S. D. and J. M. Snyder, Jr. (1997), “The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election
Outcomes”, Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 30-53.
Manacorda, M. E. Miguel and A. Vigorito (2011), “Government Transfers and Political Sup-
port”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3, 1-28
Manzetti, L. and Wilson, C. J. (2007), “Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Sup-
port?" Comparative Political Studies, 40(8), 949-970.
Markus, G. B. (1988), “The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the
Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis”, American Journal of Political Science,
32(1), 137-154.
Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3),
681-712.
Mills, H.D., (1961), “A Study of Promotional Competition", In: Bass, F.M. (Ed.), Mathematical
Models and Methods in Marketing. R.D. Irwin, Homewood, 245-301.
Mitchell, P. (2000), “Voters and their representatives: Electoral institutions and delegation in
parliamentary democracies”, European Journal of Political Research, 38, 335-351.
Moscoso-Boedo, H. J. and T. Mukoyama (2012), “Evaluating the Eﬀects of Entry Regulations
and Firing Costs on International Income Diﬀerences", Journal of Economic Growth, 17, 143-
170.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975), “The Political Business Cycle”, Review of Economic Studies, 42(2),
169-190.
North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
30
North, D. C. and R. P. Thomas (1973), The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic
History, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Olson, M. (1993), “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”, American Political Science
Review, 87(3), 567-576.
Olson, M. (2000), Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships,
Basic books.
Pande, R. and C. Udry (2006), “Institutions and Development: A View from Below”, inAdvances
in Economics and Econometrics, Blundell, Newey and Persson, eds.
Parente, S. L., and E. C. Prescott (2000), Barriers to Riches, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Park, H., A. Philippopoulos, and V. Vassilatos (2005), “Choosing the Size of the Public Sector
under Rent Seeking from State Coﬀers”, European Journal of Political Economy, 21(4), 830-
850.
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., and Trebbi, F. (2003), “Electoral Rules and Corruption”, Journal of
the European Economic Association, 1, 958-989.
Poschke, M. (2010), “The Regulation of Entry and Aggregate Productivity", The Economic
Journal, 120 (549), 1175-1200.
Powell, G. B. (2000), Elections as Instruments of Democracy, New Haven, CT:Yale University
Press.
Powell, G. B. and Whitten, G. (1993), “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking
Account of the Political Context”, American Journal of Political Science, 37(2), 391-414.
Restuccia, D. and R. Rogerson (2008), “Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity with
Heterogeneous Establishments", Review of Economic Dynamics, 11 (4), 707-720.
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., and Trebbi, F. (2004), “Institutions rule: the primacy of institu-
tions over geography and integration in economic development”, Journal of Economic Growth,
9(2), 131-165.
Samuels, D. (1999), “Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-Centric Electoral Sys-
tems: Evidence from Brazil”, Comparative Political Studies, 32, 487-518.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1993), “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3),
599-617.
Svensson, J. (2003), “Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence form a Cross Section of
Firms”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (1), 207-230.
Tornell, A. and A. Velasco (1992), “The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why
Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries”, Journal of Political Economy, 100(6), 1208-
1231.
Torvik, R. (2002), “Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare”, Journal of Development
economics, 67(2), 455-470.
31
Tullock, G. (1967), “The Welfare Costs of Tariﬀs, Monopolies and Theft", Western Economic
Journal, 5, 224-232.
Tullock, G. (1975), “On the Eﬃcient Organization of Trials”, Kyklos, 28, 745-762.
Tullock, G., (1980), “Eﬃcient Rent Seeking”, in: Buchanan, J.M., Tollinson, R., Tullock, G.
(Eds.), Toward a Theory of Rent Seeking Society, Texas AM University Press, College Station,
97-112.
Van Long, N. (2013), “The Theory of Contests: A Unified Model and Review of the Literature”,
European Journal of Political Economy, 32, 161-181.
Weatherford, M. S. (1984), “Economic Stagflation and Public Support for the Political System”,
British Journal of Political Science, 14, 187-205.
Weatherford, M. S. (1987), “How Does Government Performance Influence Political Support?”,
Political Behavior, 9, 5-28.
Wilson, R. (2016), “Does governance cause growth? Evidence from China”,World Development,
79, 138-151.
32
Table 1: Coeﬃcients of correlation and deciles of the distribution
Panel (a). Coeﬃcients of correlation
   V&A PS GE RQ RL CC
Soc. Infrastruc. 1.00 0.67 0.62 0.69 0.78 0.94 0.88 0.94 0.91
GDP p. w. 1.00 0.98 0.42 0.45 0.72 0.56 0.56 0.61
TFP 1.00 0.35 0.40 0.69 0.52 0.51 0.55
V&A 1.00 0.57 0.58 0.72 0.65 0.64
PS 1.00 0.62 0.57 0.63 0.72
GE 1.00 0.76 0.85 0.85
RQ 1.00 0.87 0.77
RL 1.00 0.88
CC 1.00
All variables in logs. Year 2014.
Panel(b). Averages
Decile    V&A PS GE RQ RL CC
1 0.03 0.12 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.11
2 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.27
3 0.15 0.17 0.31 0.48 0.51 0.34 0.35 0.25 0.31
4 0.23 0.17 0.30 0.42 0.48 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.36
5 0.34 0.24 0.39 0.56 0.68 0.51 0.54 0.47 0.43
6 0.43 0.29 0.41 0.50 0.57 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.61
7 0.58 0.39 0.49 0.81 0.86 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.66
8 0.81 0.49 0.56 0.86 1.08 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.80
9 0.99 0.72 0.73 1.01 1.16 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.94
10 1.23 0.83 0.81 1.13 1.40 1.06 1.08 1.07 1.07
Ratio of the average of the last decile to the average of the first decile
39.24 6.83 3.17 4.72 6.38 8.85 7.14 8.98 9.59
Al variables relative to U .S.Year 2014. V&A= Voice and Accountability, PS= Politica l Stab ility, GE=Governm ent
Eﬀ ectiveness, RQ=Regulatory Quality, RL=Rule of Law , CC=Control of Corruption , A=TFP, z=Social In frastruc-
-ture,y =GDP per worker.-
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Table 2: Simulated data
Decile  b   
1 8.24 7.23 0.40 0.72 0.61
2 5.82 4.77 0.60 0.83 0.76
3 5.34 2.92 0.64 0.85 0.79
4 4.75 4.21 0.69 0.87 0.82
5 4.02 2.31 0.75 0.90 0.86
6 2.64 3.26 0.86 0.95 0.92
7 2.34 1.27 0.89 0.96 0.94
8 1.65 1.34 0.95 0.98 0.97
9 1.19 1.04 0.98 0.99 0.99
10 0.84 0.92 1.01 1.00 1.01
Ratio of the average of the last decile
to the average of the first decile
0.10 0.13 2.51 1.39 1.64
All variab les relative to the calibrated values, y=GDP per worker,
z=Socia l in frastructure-, A=TFP.
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Table 3: Simulated percentage changes in productivity and social infrastructure
Percentage variation in response to 1 standard deviation increase in
(a) CC (b) V&A (c) V&A and CC
Decile         
1 83.07 23.65 37.49 0.39 0.14 0.20 84.19 23.91 37.93
2 38.89 12.22 18.88 0.43 0.15 0.22 39.59 12.42 19.20
3 32.54 10.39 15.99 0.26 0.09 0.13 32.92 10.50 16.16
4 27.07 8.77 13.44 0.32 0.11 0.17 27.51 8.91 13.65
5 21.77 7.16 10.93 0.23 0.08 0.12 22.06 7.25 11.07
6 12.22 4.13 6.26 0.27 0.10 0.14 12.54 4.24 6.42
7 10.75 3.65 5.52 0.14 0.05 0.07 10.91 3.70 5.60
8 7.32 2.51 3.79 0.13 0.05 0.07 7.47 2.56 3.86
9 5.08 1.75 2.64 0.10 0.04 0.05 5.19 1.79 2.70
10 3.59 1.25 1.88 0.09 0.03 0.05 3.68 1.28 1.92
z=Socia l In frastructure, A=TFP, y= Output p er worker, V&A=Voice and Accountability, CC=Control of
Corruption .
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